Interconnections can be an effective way to increase competition and improve market integration in concentrated wholesale electricity markets with limited participants. This paper examines the potentials for interconnections and increasing market integration in the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM). We use a time-varying Kalman filter technique to assess the degree of market integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe including Great Britain (GB). The results indicate no market integration between SEM and other European markets except for Elspot and GB. We show that the current state of market integration between SEM and GB is just 17% indicating potentials to improve market integration via increased interconnector capacity. The results indicate that liquidity of wholesale markets might be a crucial factor in the market integration process while our results remain inconclusive in determining whether increased trade of renewable can help in market integration.
Introduction
The creation of a common and integrated market for electricity was and still is a major goal of the European Commission (EC) 1 barriers to cross-border trade. As a result, electricity markets across Europe experienced liberalisation, privatisation and price deregulation so as to meet the energy policy goals and targets of sustainability, affordability and security of supply.
The development of organized wholesale spot markets (i.e. the power exchanges), increased cross-border trade of electricity and more interconnections remain the major hallmarks and means of these liberalised but largely national markets aspiring to be largely integrated.
In line with changing EU policy the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation amounting to almost 4.7% (about 500 MW) of total SEM generation capacity. The lack of greater interconnection is a real concern in a highly concentrated SEM because it may expose the market towards strategic behaviour by the incumbents leading to market power exercise and unilaterally profit from limited competition. In addition, the benefits of an integrated market also remain foregone.
It is argued that the main advantages of larger integrated markets are enhanced security of supply and a reduction in reserves needed to maintain any given level of system performance (Malaguzzi Valeri, 2009; de Nooij, 2011 ). An interconnected system is economically justifiable because it incurs lower operating costs by permitting excess supply in one node to be utilized in other nodes where the marginal cost would be higher if there were no interconnection (Charun and Morande, 1997) . Thus, the potentials for capital costs reductions exists by incurring lower investments as it may no longer necessitate maintaining reserve generating capacity in every node in case of system failures (Turvey, 2006) . The total economic surplus is also maximized as the most expensive energy is displaced. Integrated markets, in general, can lead to the highest social welfare than if the markets were to remain separate (Neuhoff and Newbery, 2005; Hobbs et al. 2005; Ehrenmann and Neuhoff, 2009) . Interconnections between two very similar markets are also desirable for a profit-seeking investor as significant revenues can be generated even without any consistent price difference between the connected markets (Parail, 2010) . Thus, interconnections can create incentives for optimizing the size and timing of new investments by associating with a more efficient system (Brunekreeft and Newberry, 2006) .
The purpose of this paper is to primarily assess the current degree of market integration between SEM against other large, mature and well-established electricity wholesale markets in Europe including Great Britain (GB) and determine the level of interconnection needed in SEM to meet the EU policy of increasing integration of electricity markets. In the process, we also estimate the gross benefits for SEM arising from international wholesale electricity price differences but by no means should be perceived as a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of interconnection in SEM as we do not explore the costs-side and is beyond the scope of this paper. We believe that competition inherently is the main driver of lower electricity prices in Europe as implicitly underscored in the EU Directives (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005) . Hence, interconnections may be an effective way to increase competition and market integration in smaller wholesale markets with limited number of participants such as SEM.
Economic studies on the theoretical and numerical models of strategic behaviour further indicate that it is more costly and hence less attractive to exploit market power in an interconnected market (Amundsen et al. 1998; Van Damme, 2004) .
Interconnection allows generating companies abroad to compete possibly with dominant domestic generators, mitigating market power (Newbery, 2002) .
Interconnecting fossil dominated electricity systems such as SEM with hydro based systems could reduce price volatility and mitigate subsequent market uncertainties (Matsukawa and Mulder, 2004) . A stable wholesale price, in turn, provides stability to the wholesale market which can further help in providing appropriate investment incentives and market signals to the market participants (Green, 2008) . Hence, SEM may benefit through increased interconnections with other EU electricity markets in terms of enhanced competition, improved security of supply and lower electricity prices.
We proceed with the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 provides an insight into the Irish wholesale electricity market. Section 3 briefly discusses the relevant literature that analyses the wholesale electricity market integration in Europe.
Section 4 describes the data and econometric methodology used in this study. The results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with relevant policy recommendations.
The Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM)
SEM is a small market encompassing approximately 2.5 million electricity customers including 1.8 million in the Republic of Ireland and 0.7 million in Northern Ireland.
The annual electricity consumption in Northern Ireland is around 8 TWh while the peak demand in 2007 was 1,669 MW (UREGNI, 2009). Electricity consumption is dominated by households as 726, 200 (92%) of the customers out of 790,500 were domestic. Small and medium enterprises (SME) accounted for a 6% of customers while larger industrial and commercial consumers constituted the remaining 2% in the market. The market is operated by SEMO (the Single Electricity Market Operator) which is a joint-venture between the two transmission operators in Ireland and Northern Ireland, namely EirGrid and SONI respectively. SEM is a centralised gross mandatory pool for any generator with an export capacity of more than 10 MW. All electricity is traded through a market clearing mechanism based on the generators bidding their Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) and receiving the System Marginal Price (SMP). The SMP constitutes of two components: shadow price and uplift. The 'shadow' price constitutes the most of SMP as it includes the cost of fuel and carbon.
The 'uplift' price has some additional costs tied to the reliable running of the market such as the generator's start-up costs and no-load costs that are indifferent to output levels 2 . In addition, the power producers separately receive capacity payments based on available generation capacity and constraint payments for the difference between the market schedule and the system dispatch to cover the longrun capital costs. Suppliers accordingly purchase electricity from the pool by paying the SMP for each trading period along with capacity payments and system charges.
Economic theory suggests that SRMC pricing is desirable to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes (i.e. allocative efficiency) by optimally allocating the scarce economic resources at a given time (Hotelling, 1939) . However, the risk of societal welfare losses (deadweight losses) is high in SEM due to the dominance of the wholesale market by two large incumbent electricity groups on the island, namely Electricity Supply Board (ESB) and Viridian with potential ability to exercise market power. ESB accounted for a market share of about 80% in 2004 while the Irish state owned 95%
of ESB with the remaining 5% owned by the employees of the company (Malaguzzi Valeri, 2009) . Wholesale market concentration is high as the installed capacity share of the three largest generators in the Republic of Ireland amounted to 95% at the end of 2004 indicating market power concerns and lack of competition. Theory also suggests that the abuse of market power can lead to productive inefficiency implying that electricity will be under-produced and will no longer be produced at the least possible average cost (Boiteaux, 1965) . Furthermore, a vertically integrated market structure (between transmission and generation) can create every incentive and opportunity for exclusionary behavior making the electricity market more susceptible towards market power abuse and exercise (Joskow, 2003) .
SEM has a negative pricing regime in place. Negative prices occur in times of high power in feed (in particular from intermittent energy sources such as wind) which leads to a lower intersection of the merit-order curve with the demand function leading to lower wholesale power prices (Nicolosi, 2010) . Hence, a negative spot price reveals the underlying opportunity costs (for example, avoided start-up and shut-down costs), gives higher value to consumer flexibility and provides additional price signal for storage of intermittent energy sources such as wind (Geneose et al., 2010) . It is further believed that increased trade of renewable in the wholesale market will greatly improve the EU electricity market integration (Joseffson, 2009 ). This is particularly interesting for SEM as Northern Ireland aims to source 40% of its generation from renewable energy by 2020. Figure one shows the scheduled generation mix in SEM for the first three quarters of 2009 (January-September) although the fuel mix is likely to change in the future. The energy diversity mix is dominated by gas fired generation constituting 69% followed by coal and wind at 9% and 7% respectively. The high reliance on imported gas and coal mostly from UK raises the security of supply risks in SEM. This also has an important implication in the SEM wholesale price formation as gas prices has been a key driver of the Irish SMP since 2007. The contribution from interconnector in the generation mix is also set to increase with the planned commercial operation of the East-West interconnector with a capacity of 500 MW joining the island with Wales from 2012. It is expected that renewable energy sources (mostly wind) will replace most of the fossil-based generation in SEM in the future. However, none of the above discussed studies on electricity markets have analyzed the development of wholesale price in SEM while the occurrence of negative prices in the European Energy Exchange (EEX) 3 and SEM possibly necessitates re-visiting the econometric methodology used in these existing studies. Hence, we study the degree of market integration of SEM with other EU electricity markets using a dynamic approach to capture the subsequent effect of any structural and unobservable changes (such as political, economic, and regulatory) as revealed through prices over time. We analyze the prices because prices aggregate and reveal market information (Grossman, 1976) . They should reflect all publicly available information while those electricity prices should instantly change to reflect new public information in line with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) assuming no transmission and distribution constraints (Fama, 1970) 4 . Thus, markets become fully integrated as 'an entire territory of which the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted commerce that prices take the same level throughout with ease and rapidity' as primarily defined by Cournot (Stigler, 1969) . Hence, in a fully integrated market the prices of homogenous products from diverse suppliers should follow same pattern over time 5 . Therefore, we analyze the wholesale spot electricity price development of SEM with other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe using a time-varying approach. A low level of market integration would indicate the possibilities to improve the integration of markets by expanding interconnections in SEM and accordingly benefit from price differences in international wholesale electricity markets. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the price development of SEM with other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe using a state-space model based on the powerful recursive Kalman filter algorithm accounting for the occurrence of negative wholesale prices in the spot market.
Data and Econometric Methodology
Bilateral wholesale electricity trading remains the dominant form of wholesale trade in some European countries including GB. The GB power trade has been dominated by over-the-counter ( prices can also avoid the temporal aggregation problems associated with using lower frequency data (such as monthly, yearly) (see Hamilton, 1994) . Thus, we examine the development of hourly and half-hourly intraday prices in this paper.
Our dataset consists of wholesale spot prices from four countries in Continental Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria); Northern Europe (i.e. the Scandinavian countries); GB and the all-island Irish countries. All of these spot markets started operating before SEM while also being large and widely interconnected as shown in leading to a liquid wholesale market whereas other power exchanges represent low liquidity in comparison to SEM (especially EXAA, Belpex, APX UK). This is because wholesale spot trading of electricity in these markets is voluntary while bulk electricity is being traded bilaterally in the OTC market.
A fundamental characteristic common across the power exchanges is the regulatory practice of day-ahead price setting based on 'sealed bid one-shot uniform price'
auctions. The market operator (i.e. the auctioneer) collects all supply and demand bids while market clearing is done once per trading day separately for each hour besides for GB where market clearing takes place every half-hour and sold electricity is physically delivered the following day. All bidders essentially receive the same price (i.e. the SMP in our case) and any bidder who lowers his quantity offer can improve his terms of trade and the terms of trade of all winners (Klemperer, 2005) .
However, market participants are only allowed to bid one energy price covering an entire day with the exception of interconnection users who bid in half-hourly energy prices while unit commitment is day-ahead in SEM. Thus, difference exist between SEM and other mature wholesale markets considered in our study in terms of market design features such as the number of physical markets, form of generation bids, market scheduling and dispatch, timing of gate closure and composition of wholesale prices (see Appendix). These factors are highly significant in terms of facilitating (or hindering) market integration of SEM with other well-established wholesale markets in Europe (Poyry, 2011) . However, despite minor differences in market structure and mechanisms, liquidity and products; the EXAA, EEX and APX operate in similar terms (Zachmann, 2008 Similarly, EEX and SEM are the only power exchanges in our study with negative wholesale pricing regime in place. The possibility to trade with dual currencies in SEM makes it a unique organized market in the world. The time frame for hourly day-ahead prices ranges from 1 January 2008 to 31
December 2011 with the total number of observations surpassing 35,000 for all markets. The data was obtained from publicly available sources while the SEM data which was provided by the utility regulator. The hourly day-ahead prices data for SEM and GB was constructed by averaging the half hourly prices within each hour.
However, the SEM prices only consist of energy only prices while the wholesale prices for other markets also include the capacity payments. Table 2 show the descriptive statistics of the logarithmic transformed day-ahead hourly wholesale prices across the power exchanges. The SEM electricity prices remain one of the highest in Europe. The day-ahead hourly wholesale prices at SEM were on average 12% higher than APX, 15% higher than APX UK, 16% higher than EEX and 25% higher than Elspot. The heavy use of gas in electricity generation coupled with (or) market power could have led to relatively higher wholesale prices in SEM though this remains to be empirically examined. While the Elspot prices were the least volatile of all; the prices in SEM and GB experienced greater volatility of all markets. The reason could be due to more uncertainties associated with gas prices as both markets have significant gas-fired generation coupled with the underlying trading uncertainty in a new, immature but liquid Irish market 8 . Hence, the notion of market integration or separation can be analyzed by testing for the convergence or divergence of the day-ahead hourly and half-hourly prices across the different markets considered in this study.
Although, cointegration analysis has been widely used to test for price convergence in the econometrics literature; one implicit assumption of cointegration analysis is that the structural relation among the prices is fixed over the considered time period. As mentioned in several studies including King and Cuc (1996) and Neumann et al. (2006) ; the cointegration analysis ignores the dynamics of any possible price convergence or divergence. Thus, considering the likely structural developments across all wholesale markets, the assumption of a fixed relationship between spot prices over time seems problematic (Growitsch and Nepal, 2011) .
Hence, we use a linear state space representation in order to examine the price convergence using Kalman filter analysis which is based on a recursive algorithm (Kalman, 1960 Therefore, the Kalman filter processes the data on both price series in two consecutive steps. It first estimates β AB,t by using available information till the period t-1. As a second step, the estimates of β AB,t are updated by incorporating prediction errors from the first step as information at time t is realized. In the process, the time variant coefficient model produces linear minimum mean error estimates of β AB, t using observed and available data through time t. According to Bomhoff (1992) , the coefficients estimate generated by the Kalman filter generally outperforms the coefficient estimate generated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and is hence preferred to OLS. Thus, being based on a specific optimization recursive algorithm it allows for the updating of the model estimations using newly available information (see Harvey, 1987; Hamilton, 1994) . The filter approach ensures that the corrections made in β AB,t beyond t (say t+k) follow a time-varying moving average process of order k-1.The recursive algorithm subsequently updates (or error corrects) the onestep ahead estimate of the state mean and variance given new available information.
If A and B spot markets are perfectly integrated, the value of β AB,t equals unity at any time t. In contrast, if β AB,t = 0 the prices of day-ahead hourly electricity traded on both markets bear no relation with each other at any time t implying perfectly uncorrelated prices 9 . A full market integration indicates limited (or no) opportunity to benefit from cross border price differences through interconnections as arbitrage opportunities become exhausted. In contrast, low market integration implies significant opportunities to benefit from differences in international electricity prices via cross border interconnections and improve market integration accordingly.
However, it is important to cautiously determine the initial variances for ε t and Ѳ t as well as of the expected value of 0  10 to provide suitable noise reduction and signal preservation in our model. Exaggerated values of 2   would lead to the inclusion of short-term behaviour making it difficult to distinguish random shocks from structural relationships. Likewise, setting the variance too low would ignore significant developments in the convergence process over time (Growitsch, Stronzik and Nepal, 2012 
Results and Discussions
It is necessary to examine the properties and nature of those series as a pre-requisite for any econometric analysis of time series. Testing for unit roots is a wellestablished methodology in econometrics literature for such analysis involving timeseries. Besides, empirical studies suggest that unit roots can also be used to test for pair-wise price convergence (or divergence) for price series (Aubyn, 1999; Bernard and Durlauf, 1996; Zachmann, 2008) . However, the concept of applying unit roots to test for price convergence can be criticized on the grounds that the stationary property of price differences can mean both convergence and divergence while in the presence of outliers unit root tests can lack power and robustness. Though, it is not our aim to examine market integration via unit roots test, Table 3 reports the results from unit root tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979 ) and Kwiatkowski; Phillips; Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test (KPSS, 1992) 11 . The results suggest that the hourly day-ahead price series including the SEM and GB are stationary at levels allowing us to assume that the first differences are also stationary in nature. Since electricity cannot be stored economically with demand having little or no effect (i.e. inelastic demand); the stationary behavior of hourly spot prices is expected. However, the absence of a unit root at levels also precludes the motivation to test for stable long run equilibrium relating between the price series. On the other hand, widely used cointegration technique such as Johansen test (Johansen 1998 (Johansen , 1991 ) assumes a constant cointegrating vector over time and thus not effectively allowing us to assess the development of market integration over time. The results from correlation analysis are economically misleading as it does not account for changes in the process of market integration (e.g. for short term price divergence) over-time. However, correlation analysis can be used to determine whether certain market pairs are integrated as the correlation coefficient provides a useful analysis on the initial level of market integration (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985) .
The correlation results from Table 4 show the static notion of market integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale markets. The relatively low price correlations of SEM with other wholesale markets are sufficiently evident enough to indicate that significant potential exists to improve market integration from interconnections. Moreover, market integration is a dynamic process and can vary with time due to changes in economic and political environment in the national and international energy markets. Table 5 illustrates the strength of price relationship between SEM and other large, mature, and interconnected wholesale markets in Europe that are not directly physically interconnected with SEM based on the Kalman filter using the Maximum Likelihood estimator (MLE) for the log prices. We believe that log prices can better reflect the underlying distribution of the residuals used in our model. Log transformed prices potentially mitigate the heteroscedastic properties of prices by minimizing the effects of high volatility and the outliers effects. , 2011) . This is because a liquid and transparent wholesale electricity prices quickly reflect and processes all the market information contained in the prices and thereby aiding the market integration process. Nonetheless, it requires further research while the market integration coefficient is still low owing to the isolation of SEM and thereby the lack of direct physical interconnection. However, market integration can be explained by a vector of factors such as the convergence of factor inputs (i.e. electricity) and final product prices; matching of institutional framework and electricity market regulation and the convergence of electricity consumption patterns coupled with similarity in generation technologies.
The above results do not consider the incorporation of negative prices in wholesale market trade which is an important element of wholesale market design in EEX and SEM. The results in Table 5 completely ignore the available information incorporated in the negative prices. This is due to the fact that log of negative prices does not exist thus leading to available information being omitted for EEX and SEM prices. Thus, we also calculate the market integration coefficient based on the raw prices for the same market pairs to better understand the role of renewable energy sources (primarily wind) wholesale electricity trade on wholesale market integration. The results are presented in Table 6 . The results show a large improvement in the final state of market integration coefficient for all market pairs after the inclusion of negative prices. The availability of more market information through negative prices might have resulted in such increase. However, the results are not significant at (1, 5 or 10)% indicating no market integration. Our results based on the existing dataset do not support (or remain inconclusive to the least) the claims of policymakers that increasing renewable wholesale trade will lead to an increasingly integrated market for electricity in Europe. Negative prices, by definition, occur at low demand levels but high wind in-feed possibly from using unlimited supply bids can leads to uncertainty and instability in the wholesale electricity trade. In order to facilitate comparison and establish a benchmark case of market integration between SEM and other markets, we also calculated the market integration coefficients among the large, interconnected and mature electricity wholesale markets considered in this study. We considered all the market pairs with high price correlation as observed from our correlation analysis. respectively. We believe that these estimates can be an important input for policymakers undertaking the CBA and interconnecting SEM with these markets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-levels numbers in brackets report the root mean squared errors However, it is likely that SEM will be further linked to GB and is already physically connected to GB. Hence, we also estimate the current state of market integration between GB and SEM using the half-hourly spot prices accounting for the negative wholesale prices in SEM. Table 8 shows the market integration coefficients for SEM and GB which evident the existence of an integrating market between SEM and GB.
The current market integration of 17% indicate that an engineering capacity of 2941
MW is required to achieve 100% market integration between GB and SEM with all other things remaining constant 15 . This would generate a gross benefit of about 306
13 These numbers are estimated by multiplying the 2009 spot market share with the average hourly wholesale price differences for all markets assuming a relatively constant demand. 14 These numbers are calculated using unitary methods based on the information available in Table 5 . 15 We estimate this number assuming that an engineering capacity of 500 MW (i.e. the Moyle interconnector) currently produces a market integration coefficient of 0.17. million euros arising from the competition effects (i.e. differences in wholesale electricity prices) between GB and SEM alone. However, our results also indicate the market integration between SEM and GB with a direct physical connection is less than the market integration between SEM and Elspot even without a direct physical interconnection. We believe that this is primarily because of the illiquidity of the GB market imply that the market is not fully able to capture the available market information via prices. It also indicates that the Moyle interconnector may not be efficiently used to generate substantial effect on market integration between SEM and GB. Liquidity in the GB wholesale market has declined since 2001 primarily because the big six vertically integrated players owning both generation and supply can sign confidential bilateral contracts with retailers outside the wholesale market (DECC, 2010) . Likewise, the market integration coefficient remains insignificant after including the negative prices making the role of renewable energy trade upon market integration inconclusive. It is also highly unlikely that market integration coefficient will reach unity as the price differences between two electricity wholesale markets cannot be zero due to transaction costs, transmission bottlenecks and other factors. As the average wholesale prices in SEM are higher than other wholesale markets in Europe including GB; significant potentials for wholesale price reductions exists through increased interconnections. Likewise, those markets with a high level of market integration can still pursue interconnections for security of supply reasons and mitigating the potentials to market power abuse. However, an interconnected system also bear certain security of supply risks as the damages in one region can easily spread along the interconnected regions via the interconnector creating a 'ripple effect' (Hammond and However, the persistence in international electricity price differences could be due to the scarcity in interconnector capacity. However, a recent study by Gebhardt and Hoffler (2010) argues that it is rather the lack of competition, a case where wellinformed traders do not engage in international electricity trade, rather than the presence of limited interconnector capacities that explains the significant difference between international electricity prices. The inefficient use of interconnector capacity is a major problem in the liberalized electricity markets in Europe. Di Nooij (2011) mention that a capacity worth almost 50 million euros was not utilized in the German-Dutch interconnector in 2004 while under-using and mis-using led to a loss of 289 million euros in the UK-France interconnector from 2001 to 2005. Hence, it is desirable that the Moyle interconnector is efficiently used and the proposal to couple GB, France and SEM by 2014 seems appropriate for this purpose.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The aim of this paper was to examine the potential of interconnections in the allisland electricity wholesale market (SEM). A time-varying econometric technique based on Kalman filter algorithm was applied to determine the degree of market integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe. Our results suggest that at the current state, market integration of SEM with other wholesale markets around Europe does not exist apart from Elspot and GB which is low. High market liquidity in SEM may have facilitated the market integration with Elspot where the average hourly wholesale prices are the lowest. The market integration with GB is a result of the direct physical interconnection between these two markets.
Our results suggest that significant opportunities to improve the market integration between SEM and other markets via increased interconnection. Even though electricity in Ireland is mostly gas fired; increased cross-border electricity trade can have a downward pressure on domestic electricity prices in the island. Apart from benefits of price differences due to growing market size and economies of scale, low market integration would also imply connecting to international markets and benefit from increased security of supply and reduced price volatility as economic theory suggests.
While the average wholesale prices in SEM continue to remain high as compared to other markets; it is desirable that focus should be directed at alternative energy sources to reduce the reliance on gas-firing. The transition towards a low-carbon economy has meant that the Irish government has targeted to achieve 40% of energy consumption from wind energy by 2020 which certainly is a forward looking move. However, our results based on the existing dataset remain inconclusive in determining whether trading intermittent energy sources (such as wind) can contribute towards market integration unless other complementary conditions such as storage, proper regulatory and market design framework, regulatory coordination etc. This will certainly require further research. Although higher wholesale prices in SEM also raise the possibilities of market power abuse due to the presence of oligopolistic elements and lack of competition; interconnecting markets and increased trading of electricity on a level playing field (i.e. a common platform such as power exchange) can offset the problems of potential market power abuse and fuel competition in the wholesale market.
Thus, it is desirable that the process of interconnecting SEM to GB is intensified while interconnections with other larger wholesale markets in Europe such as Elspot is considered based on a proper CBA. However, increasing interconnections will require huge investments in interconnector capacity and transmission networks.
Equally important will be the appropriate regulatory framework and market design that incentivizes wholesale traders to actively engage in cross-border electricity trade as well as optimally utilize the interconnector capacity and generate adequate investments in transmission infrastructure.
scheduling uses out-turn availability, demand and wind generation data hours of real time Wholesale price composition separate prices for energy and capacity; no material imbalance exposure
Prices reflect a single product with no explicit separation of energy and capacity payments; separate pricing for imbalance exposure Source: Based on Poyry (2011) 
